2024 year-end review: Winter is coming for Indonesia’s civil society forces 

If what transpired in 2024 is any indication of what to come, we can safely say that 2025 will not be a democratic spring for Indonesia.

In 2014, Indonesians welcomed the election of Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, then regarded as a reformist representing the interests of the people in a political system dominated by oligarchs. He was seen as a symbol of hope for many who believed in democracy. The expectation was perhaps unrealistic, but the hope for change was there.

Fast forward to 2024, Indonesians are again at a crossroads. This time, the public mood is much less optimistic. Former president Jokowi is no longer seen as a reformist outsider but a member of the oligarchy.  He is accused of bending many rules to allow his eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, to run as vice-presidential candidate in the February presidential election.

This political gambit proved decisive for the election this year of Jokowi’s former rival and now ally, former army general Prabowo Subianto. This, in turn, made it clear that the political climate, already chilly for supporters of democracy, is likely to quickly get even worse.

Indonesia’s democracy still under siege 

It is a truism to say Indonesia is suffering a democratic decline. The problem now is that this downward trend is expected to accelerate under President Prabowo.

In his latest remark targeting democratic institutions, Prabowo again floated the idea of abolishing direct regional head elections on the pretext of saving state money. In this scenario, regional legislators would have the authority to elect governors, mayors and regents (bupati), a throwback to the authoritarian rule of Soeharto, Prabowo’s former father-in-law. “We feel the democracy that we have … there are things that we need to fix …,” he said according to Reuters. “How many trillions spent in one or two days?”

Prabowo’s suggestion has prompted wide condemnation from pro-democracy activists. While admitting that local elections are costly, they believe it is a necessary investment.

Prabowo’s stance on regional elections is characteristic of his apparent aversion to the democratic reforms that were put in place after Soeharto’s fall. In fact, Prabowo has long expressed his intention of reviving the original draft of the 1945 Constitution. As Simon Butt argued shortly after Prabowo floated this idea during the 2014 election, this proposal means the removal of the 1999-2002 constitutional amendments, “on which Indonesian democracy is now constitutionally constructed.” It could pave the way for the new president to end direct presidential elections, scrap the presidential term limit, dissolve the Constitutional Court and further weaken the rule of law.

Prabowo’s  attempt to portray himself as a strong leader, even after months of a massive digital campaign to rebrand him as a “cuddly grandpa”, is cause for concern. The increasing presence of military officials in Prabowo’s administration is another cause for alarm. It reflects his security-oriented policies that favour a stronger military and possibly greatly increased control of public life.

Civil society bracing for repression and co-option

There is little doubt that Indonesian civil society forces are facing a greater level of threats of repression and co-option under the new president. Prabowo’s security-oriented approach to governance means it is likely the state apparatus will be more inclined to use the existing draconian laws to silence critics.

This tactic was widely used and was relatively effective under former president Jokowi. It is not impossible Prabowo will use the same playbook, given that the draconian laws Jokowi used—the Penal Code, the Electronic Information and Transaction (EIT) Law, the Pornography Law, and the Mass Organisations Law—are still in place.

However, a greater threat facing Indonesian progressives may be the regime’s strategy of co-opting different elements within civil society. Prabowo has already  been able to consolidate influence with a diverse range of different social groups, ranging from paramilitary groups such as Pemuda Pancasila (PP) and the now-banned Islam Defenders Front (FPI) (useful for street mobilisation) to intellectual groups linked to mainstream Islamic organisations (useful for manufacturing public consent for unpopular, elite-driven policies).

After his inauguration, Prabowo inducted non-elite figures, including activists and victims of political violence during the last days of Soeharto, into his Cabinet to bolster his legitimacy. It is unrealistic, however, to expect them to constrain the president. Past experience has shown that former activists trying to “fight for a change from within” the State Palace often ended up being enablers of authoritarian policies.

Many civil society organisations, mainly Muslim groups NU and Muhammadiyah, are expected to seek to maintain their independence under Prabowo. Yet, Jokowi’s years in power have shown us that supposedly progressive social and religious organisations can easily be used as political tools to safeguard elite interests at the expense of public rights.

With a greater military role in civilian affairs, and a deeper encroachment of state interests into civil society, Indonesian progressives now find themselves with a much narrower political space to advance their democratic aspirations. The recent attack by unidentified assailants on local residents opposed to the Rempang Eco-City megaproject is a clear example of how non-state actors can be mobilised to repress public protests.

Last defence of democracy

The rise of Prabowo on the back of Jokowi’s cawe-cawe (meddling) calls for the creation of a sustainable pro-democracy movement with a larger and stronger social base capable of countervailing retrograde forces at both elite and grassroots levels.

This strategy is easier said than done, however, given the fragmentation of Indonesian civil society. Furthermore, there is a clear risk that the Prabowo government will mobilise co-opted ‘uncivil’ society groups on the street and in cyberspace to disrupt oppositional forces.

There is no doubt that Indonesian civil society forces are in for a long winter as the elite continue to work towards dismantling democratic institutions. In the end, the last defence of Indonesian democracy is the Indonesian people themselves. The question is: Will they set a limit on how much democracy they are willing to lose?

In the new Indonesia Prabowo is creating, the challenge for civil society forces is to engage the public enough to raise the political cost of killing democracy.