Photo from instagram.com/prabowo
In December this year, Canberra and Jakarta will celebrate 75 years of diplomatic relations. At the same time, the Plan of Action for the Australia-Indonesia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) (2020-24) will come to an end. With strategic trust between the two countries at a high, Canberra should seize this moment to call for an elevation of Australia-Indonesia ties to a Special Strategic Partnership (SSP).
Certainly, the CSP agreement has broadened and strengthened the strategic partnership, particularly in the areas of transnational crime and maritime cooperation. But an SSP would be even better, because it realises the full potential of the bilateral security relationship, without needing a formal security alliance.
Indonesia’s strategic position
Indonesia is the world’s third-largest democracy and is projected to become the fourth-largest economy in the world by 2050. It is also Australia’s largest and most powerful neighbour. The two neighbours share the world’s longest maritime boundary.
Indonesia is subsequently a country of imperative geostrategic importance for Australia. Former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating once remarked, “How things go in the Indonesian archipelago, in many respects, so we go, therefore Australia’s strategic bread is entirely buttered in the Indonesian archipelago.”
Traditionally, Indonesia’s primary foreign policy focus has been Southeast Asia and its northern borders. In contrast to Australia, Indonesia follows a non-aligned foreign policy that forbids it from joining any formal security alliances. However, it is also in Indonesia’s national interest to have a reliable and close defence partner like Australia on its southern flank.
Moreover, both Indonesia and Australia have had a shared commitment to a rules-based maritime order in the Indo-Pacific and that could be the catalyst for an Australia-Indonesia SSP.
One of the key pillars of Indonesia’s neutralist foreign policy is the protection of its territorial integrity and national sovereignty. This pillar has been undermined in recent years by China’s growing assertiveness in Indonesia’s North Natuna Sea Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). China claims that the EEZ slightly overlaps its widely disputed nine-dash line – which according to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) has no legal basis under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Indonesia’s new president, Prabowo Subianto, was an influential defence minister, under the Jokowi presidency. In this role, he was instrumental in the signing of the new treaty-level Australia-Indonesia Defence Cooperation deal in August. Indonesia’s defence modernisation will also likely be a key feature of Prabowo’s foreign policy doctrine. This could see Indonesia become even more assertive in protecting its sovereign rights in the North Natuna Sea.
In October, China tested the resolve of the new Indonesian government, with three successive incursions by China Coast Guard vessels into the North Natuna Sea. The new Indonesian government’s response was assertive as Indonesian naval ships chased away Chinese vessels from the region.
However, on November 9, during Prabowo’s visit to Beijing, a joint China-Indonesia statement appeared to recognise China’s nine-dash line claims, which includes the North Natuna Sea. This apparent diplomatic blunder was formally clarified on November 11 by the Indonesian foreign ministry which stated that the joint statement “is not an acknowledgement of the 9-dash line clams, therefore, has no impact on Indonesia’s sovereignty over the North Natuna Sea”.
Furthermore, on 12 November, during Prabowo’s trip to Washington DC – a joint US-Indonesia leaders statement underscored the two countries unwavering support for an effective, and substantive ASEAN-China Code of Conduct in the South China Sea that adheres to international law, in particular UNCLOS. This statement was significant, as Prabowo became the first Indonesian president to publicly acknowledge that China’s Nine-dash line has no validity.
Boosting defence ties
A new SSP deal would strengthen bilateral cooperation in many traditional and non-traditional security areas. However, maritime security cooperation should be at the forefront and Australia should be more strategically ambitious about defence ties with Indonesia. For instance, under an SSP, Indonesian naval vessels could be rotationally deployed to Darwin and Perth, and Australian naval ships to Surabaya and Kupang (West Timor). This would increase high-level maritime cooperation, training and operations between the two neighbours.
Joint maritime training and exercises would be particularly beneficial for Indonesian naval personnel stationed in the Natuna archipelago. In recent years, Indonesia has been modernising its long-neglected and understrength navy.
The SSP deal could also embed regular joint patrols between Australia and Indonesia inside their respective maritime boundaries or just outside them. These patrols could strive to address shared border security threats like illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, human trafficking, people smuggling, transnational crime, piracy, and natural disasters. Indonesia loses US$23 billion annually from IUU fishing, while Australia has the world’s third-largest EEZ and is therefore wary of the growing IUU fishing threat.
The two neighbours also co-chair the Bali Process on people smuggling, trafficking in persons and related transnational crime. The Bali process is the Indo-Pacific’s premier forum for addressing irregular migration.
Finally, in the short to medium term, the SSP agreement could work towards the establishment of joint Australia-Indonesia naval patrols in international waters like the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and the South China Sea. It would be in both countries’ national interests to uphold international law and norms, particularly on questions of sovereignty, and especially under UNCLOS.
Indeed, the Australia-Indonesia CSP enshrines the advancement of the freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce and the resolution of disputes by peaceful means, in accordance with international law, particularly under UNCLOS. Indonesia has finalised several border agreements with neighbouring countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia in the last nine years. All of these agreements were carried out in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS.
New heights
Over the past 70-plus years, there have been highs and lows in the Australia-Indonesia strategic relationship. The 1995 Australia-Indonesia security agreement was torn up by Indonesia in 1999 after the Australian-led multinational intervention in East Timor. This was an all-time low in the bilateral relationship but it was able to recover from this setback and has matured over time.
In the 2006 Lombok treaty the two countries recognised each other’s territorial integrity, and they upgraded their strategic ties to a CSP in 2018. Under the new Australia-Indonesia defence cooperation agreement, the two neighbours will ramp up joint military exercises and training to unprecedented levels and allow both nations to operate from each other’s countries for mutually determined cooperative activities.
Indonesia is set to reach new heights of economic growth and confidence in the coming years. This will likely make it a more active player in shaping the international rules-based order. Amid growing unpredictability in the Indo-Pacific, now is the time for Australia to lay the foundations for an SSP with its increasingly powerful neighbour.
