How Prabowo is expanding the military’s civilian role as an instrument of presidential rule

Under the Prabowo Subianto administration, the Indonesian military is becoming increasingly embedded in civilian policy implementation under direct presidential control.

Since Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin first announced plans in late 2024 to build 100 development territorial infantry battalions, the initiative has expanded rapidly. Around 30 development territorial brigades and 155 development battalions have been established, mainly prioritising Papua and the outer islands.

Another 150 development battalions will be established in 2026, with the goal of establishing at least one battalion in every administrative region on Java by the end of the year. The long-term objective is to have one development battalion and two reserve component battalions (that can be mobilised in wartime) in every one of Indonesia’s 500 + regencies and cities.

The battalions will also be integrated into the Indonesian military’s territorial command structure, a Soeharto era legacy that extends the army’s presence from headquarters down to the provincial, city, regency, and village level. Previously, the system relied on relatively small numbers of military personnel at the provincial level (around a hundred) and down to the village level (a small handful), ostensibly for community support and assistance functions.

The new development battalions will now provide for a moderately sized rapid reaction force of around a thousand personnel led by a lieutenant colonel, who will report to the commander of the Military Regional Command (Kodam), the army’s territorial structure at the provincial level. This follows on the current administration’s plans to establish a Kodam in every province, which will facilitate top-down command and control from Jakarta, assisting the president to undertake a variety of civilian development operations.

While they are formally combat battalions, each battalion will consist of specialised companies dedicated to agriculture, animal husbandry, healthcare, and construction. The military is therefore increasingly becoming an instrument of state-led development.

Why is Prabowo establishing new battalions across the archipelago?

There are three main drivers behind the development battalions. The first is strategic. Prabowo’s thinking seems to be heavily influenced by the concept of ‘big island defence’ in Indonesia’s military doctrine. It calls for major Indonesian islands such as Kalimantan, Java, Sulawesi, Sumatra and Papua to maintain autonomous defensive and logistical capabilities, including local food production.

This is to prepare for the worst-case scenario in the event of a major conflict in which supply lines are cut, and Java cannot reinforce the outlying islands. The development battalions, along with the newly established Special Forces commands located on each large island, are organised to respond to security contingencies without support from Java.

The second reason is to use the military to combat illegality and crime. The military has played a visible role in the government’s crackdown on illegally converted forestry areas through the Task Force for Ordering Forest Areas, which is helmed by the defence minister. At a recent parliamentary hearing, Sjafrie argued that the development battalions also contribute to the reduction of crime through regular patrols and the revitalisation of neighbourhood security systems.

The third driver is civilian policy implementation. The battalions provide the president with a disciplined and rapidly deployable force for disaster relief, infrastructure construction, and other community projects like medical care, social assistance, or the rollout of priority programmes, such as the Free Meal Program (MBG).

Underscoring the military’s growing non-security role, it has built more than 300 bridges this year and played a key role in the reconstruction of Sumatra after the devastating floods late last year. The military is increasingly becoming the instrument of first resort for civilian development programmes rather than the last.

Behind this growing reliance on the military lies a deeper distrust of the civilian bureaucracy. In recent speeches, Prabowo has repeatedly criticised what he describes as ‘disobedient bureaucrats‘ who act as though they are above the law. The military, by contrast, offers a hierarchical institution accustomed to centralised command and rapid execution.

A return to ‘dual function’?

The expansion of the development battalions has inevitably revived concerns about the return of the military’s ‘dual function’ (Dwifungsi) doctrine, which under Soeharto justified the armed forces’ dominant role in both politics and security. However, the current trajectory differs in important ways from the New Order model.

On one hand, the Prabowo’s administration growing reliance on the military stems from Prabowo’s own comfort with the military organisation’s respect for hierarchy and obedience. On the other hand, Prabowo is not keen to restore the military as an autonomous political force that would likely be a threat to his own political power. Instead, he is strengthening the military as a policy instrument under his personal control to achieve his civilian development objectives and strategic vision.

As president, Prabowo benefits from a military that is institutionally powerful but personally loyal and subservient to him. Thus, this is not a return to authoritarian military rule in its old form. Rather, Indonesia is witnessing the emergence of a new model in which an institutionally powerful military becomes deeply embedded in civilian governance while remaining personally subordinate to presidential authority.

These “dual-use” battalions are lightly trained and unlikely to contribute significantly to the military’s core function of external defence. They also divert budgetary resources from the defence budget. However, it is clear that they provide enormous discretion for political officeholders to pursue political and civilian development goals.