Image from x.com/ChinaMilitaryBugle
On 11 August 2026, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Indonesian Navy conducted a joint exercise in the waters east of Taiwan. The announcement quickly provoked a strong protest from Taiwan, which condemned the exercise as provocative and sought clarification from Indonesia.
Soon afterwards, the Indonesian Ministry of Defence stated that after participating in the Orruda Exercise in Vladivostok, Russia, the Indonesian naval vessel, KRI Gusti Ngurah Rai (GNR)-332, plans to conduct a ‘passing exercise’ (PASSEX) with some countries whose vessels it will pass on its way back home. It did not specifically mention China, but neither did it deny the PLA announcement. PASSEX is a drill conducted by navy vessels from two different countries or more, either during a port visit or while they are passing through a country’s maritime jurisdictions.
The Ministry of Defence statement reiterated that the ‘passing exercise’, will not be a ‘war-fighting exercise’ but rather part of the maritime diplomacy of naval vessels around the world. The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also added that the exercise will be conducted in a ‘professional manner when navigating international shipping lanes’.
But, while an Indonesia-China joint passing exercise may be legal and, in fact, common among navies worldwide, it also risks escalating tensions in the area, given Taiwan’s contentious international status.
For years, Indonesia has been clear that does not want to be involved in conflict between China and Taiwan. However, the GNR-332 passing exercise may now put Indonesia right in the middle of tensions between the two countries
‘Free and active’ diplomacy
In its statement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed there has been no change to Indonesia’s foreign policy posture. Indonesia, it said, remains consistent in upholding the principles of ‘Free and Active’ diplomacy and the One China Policy, and does not take sides in regional geopolitical tensions.
Although neither the Chinese nor the Indonesian statement publicly announced the specific coordinates and time of the exercises, ABC reported that Wu Tien-jen, a senior Taiwanese intelligence official, said an Indonesian frigate was detected around 80 nautical miles off Taiwan’s east coast, which he said was in Taipei’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
But Indonesia sees it differently. Because it does not recognise Taiwan as an independent state, it considers the area to be part of China’s EEZ, not Taiwan’s.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a treaty which regulates nearly all activities in the ocean, does not specifically regulate military exercises in the 200-nautical-mile EEZs. Military exercises outside territorial waters, including archipelagic waters, are therefore often regarded as ambiguous.
This because Article 58 of UNCLOS states that in the EEZ all states enjoy ‘the freedoms referred to in Article 87 of navigation … , and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms’. As a result, many countries, including the United States, argue that all states can conduct military activities, exercises, and surveillance in a foreign EEZ without the coastal state’s permission. But this shouldn’t be an issue, since both Indonesia and China claimed they were conducting the exercises in China’s own EEZ.
Unnecessary provocation
Under President Xi Jinping, China has repeatedly reiterated its position that Taiwan is part of China and will eventually be ‘unified’, and has conducted a series of military activities that aim to threaten and isolate Taiwan. These include increasing military presence and conducting Chinese navy manoeuvres near Taiwan.
It is clear that China now wants to use the Indonesian navy passing exercise to further its own agenda of isolating Taiwan and putting pressure on it.
Indonesia’s decision to conduct military exercises with China therefore shows political insensitivity that may create an unnecessary provocation in the region. It also raises even more fundamental questions about Indonesia’s foreign policy under President Prabowo Subianto.
He claims to be implementing Indonesia’s longstanding ‘free and active’ foreign policy by engaging with both the United States and China. However, his administration visibly lacks a clear strategy for doing this, and that leaves Indonesia prone to pressure from both superpowers.
In the two years of Prabowo’s rule, engagements with both the US and China have gone well beyond the limits of Indonesia’s traditional foreign policy stance. Given the US-Indonesia tariff agreement, the proposal for overflight access in Indonesian airspace for the US, and the recent MRO project for US Air Force aircraft, Indonesia seems to have moved much closer to the US.
However, the joint development proposal in the North Natuna Sea and now the joint passing exercise have also dragged Indonesia closer to Beijing.
Indonesia needs to be very cautious about conducting such joint exercises. Consciously or unconsciously, Beijing is using Jakarta to further its own agenda to squeeze Taiwan.
