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It is less than a month into Prabowo Subianto’s presidency, but already he has signalled a major departure from his predecessors’ well-established foreign policy positions.
Soon after his inauguration, Prabowo sent his foreign minister and protege, Sugiono, to attend the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, and express Jakarta’s interest in joining the bloc. This represents a shift from Jokowi’s careful approach of keeping engagement with BRICS informal. The former president always preferred the OECD, which Indonesia is preparing to join by 2027.
Prabowo’s first major foreign policy visits were to China and the United States. In Beijing in early November, a joint statement was issued that referred to cooperation in ‘areas of overlapping maritime claims.’ Analysts criticised this as signalling recognition of China’s illegal claims in the South China Sea, undermining Indonesia’s maritime territorial sovereignty.
In response to mounting criticism, the Foreign Ministry (often referred to as ‘Pejambon’, the street where it is located), released a vague statement on 11 November to ‘clarify’ Indonesia’s position. This emphasised its unchanging stance of preserving its maritime territorial sovereignty under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, this statement seems to contradict the Beijing Joint Statement.
Prabowo’s realpolitik
The foreign policy fiasco created by the Beijing joint statement could be the first of many foreign policy surprises from Prabowo. It reflects what are likely to be two key features of Indonesia’s foreign policy under his leadership: Prabowo’s ‘hands-on’ leadership style and his realpolitik ideology.
Prabowo’s personalised approach to foreign policy emphasises active presidential engagement. Before his inauguration, he visited more than 20 countries and held around 84 meetings with foreign counterparts, meeting influential state and business leaders. He also used his position as Defence Minister to boost his international profile. Most notably, he made headlines in 2023 at the Shangri-La Dialogue when he proposed a solution to end the War in Ukraine .
This active approach contrasts with that of Jokowi, who rarely made international visits and delegated foreign policy leadership to his foreign minister, Retno Marsudi.
Prabowo’s hands-on approach is also visible in his choice of Sugiono, a trusted loyalist politician from his Gerindra Party, as foreign minister, rather than a career diplomat. Prabowo also appointed three Vice Ministers to assist Sugiono: Islamist politician Anis Matta and two senior diplomats, Armanatha Nasir and Arif Havas Oegroseno. While Anis Matta will focus on the Palestinian issue, the other vice ministers’ roles remain unclear.
In any case, these appointments are arguably the biggest overhaul of the Foreign Ministry since the appointment of Alwi Shihab as foreign minister more than two decades ago. Like Sugiono, Shihab was a politician and not a Pejambon insider.
Analysts have viewed Sugiono’s appointment as reflecting Prabowo’s plans to place his ‘personal imprint ‘ on the Foreign Ministry, changing it from being key advisor to simply the executor of his decisions – or maybe just the diplomatic ‘cleaner’, whose job is to clear up any diplomatic mess left by higher-ups
This personalised approach is largely driven by Prabowo’s embrace of realpolitik in his foreign policy, which emphasises pragmatic calculations and engagement with great powers to resolve international issues, rather than commitments to multilateralism.
Prabowo’s realism is reflected in his direct engagement with China and the United States (US). He is aware of America’s increasing economic absence in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to maximise benefits through economic interaction with China. This is not so difficult, given China is already Indonesia’s largest economic partner.
This may explain the Beijing Joint Statement, which had the effect of sending a strong signal to the US to increase engagement with Indonesia. The US has sought to deter China from its illegal maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea, and it openly mentioned UNCLOS in a joint statement with Indonesia, issued on 12 November, soon after Indonesia’s Joint Statement with China.
While Indonesia’s position on China claims in South China Sea is now, at best, ambiguous, it seems likely Prabowo is using closer engagement with Beijing as a way to open further talks with Washington and enhance Indonesia’s geopolitical standing with both countries.
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Tensions with Pejambon?
Prabowo’s hands-on and realist approach does not fit well with Indonesia’s long-standing foreign policy approach, pursued by the Foreign Ministry for the last two decades. This emphasises multilateralism and respect for international law.
Retno Marsudi, for example, repeatedly called ASEAN ‘the cornerstone of Indonesia’s diplomacy’. More specifically, in the South China Sea, Indonesia had firmly supported UNCLOS and international legal order as the basis for negotiations with all parties, including China.
Prabowo’s realpolitik diplomacy puts a premium on leadership engagement to strengthen Indonesia’s position in global politics without relying on the ASEAN multilateralism that has been at the heart of Pejambon’s approach. It could mean abandoning Indonesia’s long-standing informal leadership in ASEAN. It also risks undermining the trust of close neighbours who have a stake in the South China Sea dispute – most notably the Philippines.
Prabowo’s thinking is reflected in his 2024 campaign manifesto, which does not mention ASEAN or other international institutions. A campaign manifesto by Gerindra, written in 2022, even argues that Indonesia’s ASEAN-based foreign policy should be abandoned because it has become ‘a historical artefact’ and undermines Indonesia’s national interest.
This approach has reportedly created tensions between the old guard in Pejambon and the president, with the Beijing Joint Statement suggesting a much-diminished role for the Foreign Ministry under Prabowo. It is unlikely these tensions will be resolved anytime soon. In fact, they have been brewing since Prabowo’s tenure as defence minister, when he repeatedly clashed with Pejambon over a range of issues, from his 2023 Ukraine Peace Plan to his 2021 Bahrain speech on AUKUS.
There are also internal tensions at Pejambon that make things worse. Insiders report a generation gap, with many senior diplomats loyal to Retno Marsudi (including Armanatha Nasir, who was her spokesperson) surprised by the decision to appoint Arif Havas Oegroseno as Vice Minister. Under Jokowi, Havas was a critical voice and he has won the support of many junior diplomats. This disunity inside Pejambon will weaken its position if it does try to provide balance to Prabowo’s policies.
A middle ground
It seems clear enough that Prabowo’s pragmatic realpolitik policies will be the new norm in Indonesian foreign policy and diplomacy, and that he will be willing to ignore the Foreign Ministry’s views.
But for Indonesia to play the stronger leadership role in global politics he wants, Prabowo may need to balance his realism with Indonesia’s tradition of embracing multilateralism. One way would be to increase the Foreign Ministry’s institutional capacity to deliver multilateral diplomacy and citizens’ protection abroad.
The ministry can also provide long-term strategic advice and institutional views to balance Prabowo’s pragmatic and tactical decisions by combining their institutional capacity with the other ministries. A national security council, as proposed by Endy Bayuni, would be a good platform for different institutions, including the Foreign Ministry, to provide strategic advice and balance the President’s idiosyncratic views.
But at the end of the day, the Foreign Ministry will probably just have to change. There is no other way: it will just have to accept that Prabowo might not adhere to diplomatic traditions, long-term strategic calculations, or even long-held principles and global norms.
Prabowo has shaken the Ministry out of its comfort zone. Over the next five years it should focus on internal reform and stabilisation, and, together with the presidential office, work to prepare a new long-term strategic outlook to give shape to Indonesia’s ambitions for louder voice in global politics.
