Photo from instagram.com/@prabowo

In his inaugural speech on 20 October 2024, President Prabowo Subianto stressed that Indonesia’s democracy must be ‘uniquely Indonesian’, rooted in the country’s history and culture. He emphasised that “[our] democracy should be a polite democracy, where differences of opinion do not lead to hostility” and where criticism is given without insults, hatred, or deceit. The former general called  for a form of democracy that is “cool-headed” and “peaceful,” one that rejects violence, provocation, and incitement. His view was later referred to by observers as a demokrasi santun or ‘polite democracy’.

Prabowo’s account of democracy places greater value on civility and cohesion than on contestation and debate. This narrative is not unique to Indonesia. It reflects a particularistic view of democracy grounded in organicist ideas and so-called ‘Eastern’ or ‘Asian’ values. In Indonesia, this view particularly manifests in theories of Integralism or the ‘family principle’ (kekeluargaan) that underscore unity and harmony and have supported the country’s authoritarian past, particularly Soeharto’s New Order.

But this understanding of Indonesia’s democracy based on the singularity of indigeneity is not only prone to abuse, but also inherently reductionist.It disregards rich and complex Indonesian views of democracy – and their experience of it, with popular struggles against authoritarianism and oppression persistent throughout the history of the country.

The case for confrontational dissent

The reproduction of cultural narratives and myths, such as the ideal of a harmonious village, often serves to maintain the existing power hierarchy. The new administration’s emphasis on similar narratives, now presented as ‘polite democracy’, warrants caution because it can be easily abused to silence critics and suppress opposition. The appeal to civility can frame dissent as ‘inappropriate’ or ‘disrespectful’, diverting attention from legitimate criticism and impeding meaningful debate.

In fact, the notion that criticism can only be polite was recently used to justify the temporary suspension of a student body at Universitas Airlangga for displaying a large banner that mockingly congratulated the president and vice president on their inauguration. It suggested the first was a human rights abuser and the second held office unconstitutionally.

As many scholars have observed, Indonesia’s democratic journey after the fall of Soeharto in 1998 was marked by significant challenges. The 2024 presidential victory of Prabowo and Gibran must be understood in the broader context of ongoing democratic erosion and power consolidation among political and oligarchic elites – particularly in light of Jokowi’s mobilisation of state resources to undermine electoral democracy in favour of the pair.

At the same time, social movements have remained relatively resilient in challenging elite abuse. This is evident in the latest public pushback against the national legislature’s attempt to overturn constitutional court rulings aimed at preventing consolidation of power in regional elections. While social movements in the post-Soeharto era may still be disorganised and not always successful, vibrant civil society, and the range of protests both online and in the streets, suggest the Indonesian public is not a completely submissive polity.

This means Indonesia’s democracy cannot be reduced to the culturalist framing of a polite and conflict-adverse society. Beyond formal participation in elections, the public increasingly call for involvement in policies that affect their lives.

Moreover, decades under Seoharto, Indonesia witnessed a long struggle for democratic reform that finally gained momentum during the Asian financial crisis, which began in 1997. Civil society movements advocating for legal aid and human rights emerged and worked creatively for many decades within the constraints of the original (unamended) 1945 Constitution and a weak legal system, persistently agitating for change. Under Soeharto, Adnan Buyung Nasution, Todung Mulya Lubis, and Marsillam Simandjuntak, among others, produced works that disputed the ideological foundation of Soeharto’s authoritarian New Order, challenging cultural claims of the state’s incompatibility with democratic government.

Indonesian thinkers and activists are very aware that culture tends to function as an instrument of power to sustain control. A prominent foreign scholar of Indonesia, Daniel S. Lev, contributed to this, pointing out that culture is “subject to the whims of whoever is in a position to say what it is: political leaders and scholars.”

Radical roots of Indonesian democracy

A historical exploration of the Indonesian struggle for independence and revolutionary period also points to diverse views among Indonesian thinkers on what ‘free Indonesia’ would look like, reaching well beyond indigeneity-based idealistic notions of a harmonious Javanese village. As David Bourchier writes, Indonesian nationalist thought and movements before independence were more influenced by Marxist and social democratic ideas, particularly the concept of popular sovereignty, than by rightist or anti-enlightenment ideologies. This could suggest a deeper and more complex conception of democracy among Indonesian thinkers.

For instance, key revolutionary leaders  Mohammad Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir grounded their views of popular sovereignty on the anti-colonial struggle against all types of oppression: imperialism, totalitarianism, and feudalism. Certainly Hatta, Indonesia’s first vice president, and later twice prime minister, was inspired by indigenous democratic practices, especially those of the Minangkabau. However, he presented them within a framework of social democracy that emphasises egalitarianism and respects individual freedom. Hatta also warned against excessive idealising of indigenous customs, stating that the “good points of our village democracy cannot all be applied indiscriminately at the level of the state.”

Similarly, Sjahrir, also a prime minister of Indonesia, argued that revolution should not resort to over-idealised indigineity and nationalistic values that breed feudal and fascist rules.  He stressed the danger of overlooking the fact that “feudalism too is one of our enemies.” Although Sjahrir and Hatta both championed the constitutional democracy typically associated with Western tradition, they also strongly criticised the capitalist nature of Western liberal democracy.

This may explain their interest in social democracy and collectivist ideas such as mutual consultation and common goods. Their ideas of collectivism aimed to uphold the sovereignty of the people (kedulatan rakyat) and envisioned social and economic equality rather than the highly romanticised view of village life that underpins integralism.

Although the integralist tradition, emphasising civility and harmony, came to dominate the country for decades, and was even official doctrine under Soeharto, its success is better understood as the result of political dynamics and power struggles, rather than as a manifestation of Indonesian culture. In particular, it cannot be separated from Soeharto’s cultural campaigns and strategic use of the family principle to legitimise his interests and marginalise  dissenting views.

Resisting culturalist claims

Indonesia’s post-Soeharto constitutional reforms certainly contain critical flaws. Nonetheless, they facilitated a democratic transition that created a better environment for advancing public aspirations and holding government accountable. Cultural narratives aimed at reversing the country’s democratic gains must therefore be resisted.

For instance, political elites have recently called for a return to indirect elections of local heads of government, associating direct elections with individualism and capitalism and arguing that they are contrary to the nation’s culture (budaya bangsa). This culturalist claim not only undermines Indonesia’s complex democratic experience, but also enables the consolidation of power by elites, especially in the present political landscape.

The persistent oligarchic influence that would benefit from a return to authoritarianism complicates the task of resisting democratic regression. In 1945, Sjahrir, in his call for not only national but also democratic revolution, described Indonesia’s struggle as “a profoundly popular struggle.” This view seems to still resonate today. The Indonesian people, as is the case in many fragile contexts, find themselves facing what Roberto Gargarella referred to as a government “of a few people, controlled by the elite, and for the privileged.” The culturalist claim of Prabowo’s polite democracy can therefore function as a tool for elite control to stifle dissent under the guise of civility and cohesion.

We need more, not less, democracy, whether it is polite or not.

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