U.S. Navy Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Kaylianna Genier
One of the key regional challenges the incoming administration of President Prabowo Subianto must address is how Indonesia should position itself regarding potential armed conflict between Taiwan and China.
Over the years, Indonesia’s security focus has increasingly centered on border disputes in the South China Sea, where its interests overlap with adjacent countries including Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia. With its extensive coastline, Indonesia is not a direct claimant in the South China Sea dispute, although in recent years China’s coastguard vessels have been roaming the Natuna Islands, inside Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone.
Nevertheless, Indonesia does need to pay more attention to the stability of cross-strait relations to the north. Currently, over 400,000 Indonesians live and study in Taiwan, the majority of whom are migrant workers employed in essential industries such as construction, healthcare, and hospitality. In fact, Taiwan is now the third-largest destination for Indonesian migrant workers after Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. Indonesia is Taiwan’s 14th largest trading partner, with a net export value of nearly US$ 4.5 billion going to Indonesia in 2023.
But despite these statistics, the Taiwan Strait issue does not resonate strongly with Indonesia’s foreign policy community. Jakarta’s attitude towards the escalating tensions in cross-strait relations remains dismissive or, at best, reflects an underlying belief that violent conflict will never materialise. It is, unfortunately, safe to assume that Indonesia currently has neither a plan, nor the capacity, to protect and evacuate its many citizens in Taiwan if a military conflict occurs.
China and Indonesia
For years, China has been Indonesia’s largest trading partner, and trade continues to grow. Chinese investment has been pivotal in pushing through the most ambitious projects undertaken by the outgoing President Joko Widodo, such as the first high-speed railway in Southeast Asia, connecting Jakarta and Bandung.
China’s investments have also bolstered Indonesia’s mining capacity, particularly by propelling the downstream nickel industry, amid widespread criticism of Indonesia’s decision to ban nickel raw exports from 2020. Having the world’s largest nickel reserves, Indonesia, with China’s help, is now gaining momentum towards becoming a key player in the global electric vehicle value chain.
Reports have noted that China’s investments are also directed at accelerating the development of basic infrastructure by building roads, ports, and bridges, enhancing the nation’s overall development and accessibility.
It is therefore not surprising that Indonesia has repeatedly emphasised its unambiguous stance of support for the ‘One China Policy’ when called out.
But none of these factors should give Indonesia a free pass to ignore the urgency of the situation in the Taiwan Strait, as it is currently doing. It appears to be paying little attention to the latest political dynamics in Taiwan, even though they could well disrupt the status quo of cross-strait relations.
China was quick to respond critically to the results of the election in Taiwan earlier this year, when the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) retained its power and its leader, Lai Ching-te, became president. President Lai has been known as a longstanding advocate for a greater Taiwanese independence from the Chinese mainland. Beijing sees him as an obstacle to its obsession with the complete unification of China.
Knowing that political tensions are escalating and the situation in the Taiwan Strait is heating up, Taiwan continues to seek to expand dialogue with international partners. I recently visited Taiwan on the invitation of the Taipei Economic and Trade Office (TETO). There I met with key foreign policy communities and representatives from both the ruling and opposition parties. My week-long visit revealed a sense of frustration with Jakarta’s indifferent attitude towards Taipei.
It is true that Indonesia faces constraints to cooperating openly with Taiwan. China is both Indonesia’s largest export destination and its most significant source of imports. President-elect Prabowo Subianto also made his first visit after the election to Beijing, highlighting the strategic importance of China for Indonesia’s future foreign policy. But to protect over 400,000 Indonesians in Taiwan, Indonesia needs to adopt a more security-minded approach to the cross-strait issue without compromising its good relations with China.
Testing ‘independent and active’
Indonesia, and the world in general, clearly cannot afford to let cross-strait relations deteriorate further. Taiwan contributes over 60 percent of the global semiconductors used in high-tech industries and 90 percent of the most advanced ones. A worsening situation in the Straits could lead to a severe disruption of the global tech value chain, in addition to potentially huge loss of life and global economic setbacks.
With both Taiwan and Indonesia having new presidents, elites from both sides have an opportunity to reset, and forge a more engaging relationship based on principles of mutual interest and support for the status quo between Taiwan and China. President Prabowo’s military background and his natural instincts on security issues could be beneficial in building communication between the two countries. At this point, a series of ‘backdoor’ meetings may be the best way to facilitate candid discussions and build mutual understanding.
Engagement with Taiwan will not be easy, as it requires Indonesia to go beyond traditional diplomatic channels. However, it would be a good test of whether its ‘independent and active’ foreign policy doctrine can live up to its promise.
