Project M/Adrian Mulya
Indonesia’s House of Representatives (DPR) on Thursday approved controversial amendments to Law 34 of 2004 on the Indonesian Military (the TNI), despite public fears it will further expand military intervention in civilian affairs.
Protestors led by student activists stormed the DPR building as lawmakers were holding a plenary session to approve the law. On Thursday night, the protestors broke through security barriers and entered the DPR building to voice their opposition to what they believe is the return of the ‘dual function’ (dwi fungsi) of the military, once a pillar of the authoritarian regime of Seoharto.
What follows is an edited statement released by the Indonesian Centre for Law and Policy Studies (PSHK) on the validity of the newly passed TNI law. The kind of concerns they outline could become the basis of a petition to the Constitutional Court for judicial review of the amendments.
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“As a response to law-making that has departed from the framework of reform, constitutional provisions and legislative procedures, PSHK offers the following critical notes regarding the TNI Law revisions.
These notes are our moral and intellectual responsibility because the results of the Legislative Plenary Meeting held on Thursday, 20 March 2025, are a historic turning point for Indonesia. We hope these notes will also be a source of reflection for all DPR members, who are supposed to represent the people but have failed to address the concerns of the wider community.
The TNI Law Revision was not properly included in the 2025 National Legislative Program
The TNI Law Revision was declared a priority bill in the 2025 National Legislative Program (Prolegnas) in the Plenary Session of 18 February 2025, but this was not listed on the agenda for that meeting. Changes to the meeting agenda were not carried out in accordance with Article 290(2) of DPR Regulation 1 of 2020 on DPR Standing Orders (the DPR Rules), namely that proposed changes to the meeting agenda must be submitted in writing two days before the meeting is held.
Moreover, it was decided that the TNI Law Revision would be included in the 2025 National Legislative Program without any input from the DPR Legislation Agency (as required by Article 66(f) and 67(3) of the DPR Rules). This input is important because it needs to be established that the current revisions to the TNI Law are more urgent than other priority bills — such as the Military Court Bill, the Asset Confiscation Bill, or the Customary Law Communities Bill — before changes can be made to the 2025 National Legislative Program. The DPR Legislation Agency’s input is needed in order to satisfy the accountability principle.
In addition, the revised 2025 National Legislation Program, which includes the revisions to the TNI Law, was not publicly disseminated by the DPR Legislation Agency in accordance with its obligations under Article 66(l) of the DPR Rules. This is detrimental to the public, especially since the discussion was carried out so quickly, in a single session. Failure to carry out these duties is the responsibility of the DPR Legislation Agency, which is tasked with ensuring that legislative governance in the DPR runs in an accountable manner.
Deliberation of the TNI Law Revision violated Chapter V of Law 12 of 2011 on Lawmaking
Deliberation of the TNI Law Revision bill bypassed the drafting stage. This is because the President’s letter appointing a government representative for discussion of the bill was issued on 13 February 2025, and the bill was included in the 2025 National Legislative Program (planning stage) on 18 February 2025. The President’s Letter triggered the discussion stage between the DPR and the government, with the first working meeting held on 11 March 2025.
This procedure (skipping the drafting stage) could only have been possible if the TNI Law Revision was a ‘carry-over’ bill, that is, it continued discussions in the DPR that took place in the 2019-2024 period. However, the TNI Law Revision was not a carry-over bill according to DPR Decree 64/DPR RI/I/2024-2025 on the 2025 Priority Bill National Legislation Program and the 2025-2029 National Legislative Program. Article 71A of Law 15 of 2019 (amending Law 12 of 2011 on Lawmaking) provides that:
“In the event that the discussion of the Bill as intended in Article 65(1) has begun discussion of the Problem Inventory List during the current DPR term, the results of the discussion of the Bill are submitted to the DPR for the following period and, based on the agreement of the DPR, the President, and/or the DPD, the Bill can be reintroduced into medium-term National Legislative Program list and/or annual priority National Legislative Program list.”
As, during the process of formulating revisions to the TNI law in the previous term of the DPR (2019-2024), the President never sent a presidential letter and problem inventory list to the DPR for discussion, the TNI Law Revision cannot be considered a carry-over bill. Consequently, the TNI Law Revision process should have begun at the earlier drafting stage, but this did not happen.
The TNI Law Revision was not discussed transparently, preventing public participation
The draft TNI Law Revision was never officially disseminated by the DPR and government. As a result, the public could not participate meaningfully. This was made worse by the DPR’s decision to discredit opinions critical of the draft by stating that the version seen by the public was not the same version being discussed by the DPR. This only confirms that the DPR failed in its duty to publicly disseminate the draft TNI Law Revision in accordance with Article 96(4) of Law 13 of 2022 (amending Law 12 of 2011 on Lawmaking) and Article 7(b) of the DPR Rules.
Additionally, the discussion of the TNI Law Revision was held in a hotel with a high level of security, so public access to official discussions of the TNI Law Revision was impossible. Despite a high level of public opposition and fatal breaches of procedure, Commission I of the DPR (responsible for defence, foreign affairs etc) pressed ahead with the deliberation of the Bill, even though they had exceeded the maximum number of sessions permitted for deliberation (three).
Jakarta, 20 March 2025
The Indonesian Centre for Law and Policy Studies (PSHK)
