Two factors have placed Indonesian foreign policy in this uncomfortable position: the president's deep-seated distrust of the foreign policy establishment, and his inability — or unwillingness — to separate loyalty from expertise in assembling his foreign policy team.

A key concern from the recent Indonesian riots is the targeting of private residences of legislators and technocrats—an emerging development. Historically, rioters focused on commercial areas, malls, and vehicles. Yet, influenced by Nepal’s example circulating on Indonesian social media, protesters have shifted toward attacking the homes of politicians and officials. While provocateurs may be orchestrating this trend, the normalization of such targets risks making attacks on private residences a spontaneous feature of future unrest.

These individuals often accompany the president from his residence in Hambalang, West Java, to the State Palace in Jakarta. They travel with him, join official state visits, and take part in both small and large cabinet meetings.

There are no official statistics on the cost of presidential campaigns in Indonesia but official campaign reports are far below informed estimates. For Indonesia's business tycoons, political donations might be the most important investment decisions they make over the next five years.

The National Awakening Party (PKB) is sometimes described as the political vehicle of Islamic organisation Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). So why was PKB leader Muhaimin Iskandar absent from the swearing-in ceremony for the new NU leadership team?

Even from an investment perspective, the controversial omnibus law looks set to underdeliver, writes Ahmad Syarif Syechbubakr.

President Joko Widodo's focus on the economy led him to initially ignore the seriousness of the coronavirus threat, writes Ahmad Syarif Syechbubakr.

Ahmad Syarif Syechbubakr writes that most analyses of the recent Jakarta riots have ignored the social situation on the ground, which provided a fertile environment for the riots to escalate.