https://www.antaranews.com/berita/3902502/presiden-joko-widodo-olahraga-dan-sarapan-dengan-airlangga-hartarto
President Joko Widodo had breakfast with Golkar General Chair Airlangga Hartarto at the Bogor Botanical Gardens in this file photo. Photo by Golkar.
The shock resignation of Golkar chairman Airlangga Hartanto on 12 August 2024 presents a test case for the grand old party as it scrambles to elect a new leader amid rumors of a potential takeover by President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo.
Golkar, currently the second largest party in Indonesia, will hold an emergency national meeting (Munaslub) in Jakarta on 21 August 2024 to elect Airlangga’s successor. Speculation is rife, however, that the party will likely elect Investment Minister Bahlil Lahadalia as Chair, with Jokowi as Chief Patron. While both Golkar and Jokowi have denied this, many still believe the party is facing powerful external pressures and could be on the verge of being ‘captured’.
The first indication of this is Airlangga’s surprise departure.
Why did Airlangga quit?
There was no logical reason for Airlangga to quit his post.
Under his leadership, Golkar’s electoral performance improved significantly, with a 3% increase in voting share from 12.31% in 2019 to 15.29% in 2024. Moreover, the number of Golkar seats in the House of Representatives (the DPR) increased from 85 to 102, while the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) lost 18 seats, falling from 128 to 110. As a result, Golkar retained – and strengthened – its place as the second-largest party and the largest party in the ruling coalition: Koalisi Indonesia Maju (KIM). The party also did well in regional legislative elections, overtaking PDI-P as the largest party in the regions. It won 13 of 38 provinces, while PDI Perjuangan won just 12 and Gerindra only 5.
Given Golkar’s stellar performance, Airlangga’s resignation is, on the face of it, baffling. It makes little sense that he would leave the party’s leadership while it was searching for candidates to contest the concurrent regional elections set for November, and while president-elect Prabowo Subianto (who was nominated by Golkar) was choosing his Cabinet in the lead-up to inauguration in October.
Moreover, there was no sign of internal challenge facing Airlangga either, and he had garnered support from all the party’s local branches. Golkar’s national congress was initially scheduled for December 2024, and the party seemed stable enough to keep him in power until then.
Questions have thus been raised over the actual reasons for Airlangga’s resignation — are there internal or external pressures pushing him to resign? Was he forced to resign? Media reports have suggested that Airlangga, who now serves in the powerful role of coordinating minister for the economy, was forced to resign by the powers that be after reportedly being summonsed by the Attorney General’s Office as a witness in a corruption case centering on crude palm oil export (CPO). This speculation gained traction after Golkar executive Nusron Wahid confirmed that Bahlil Lahadalia, widely known to be close to Jokowi, now appears to be the sole contender in Golkar’s leadership race.
Why Golkar matters
Despite being Soeharto’s electoral vehicle and a key part of his New Order system, Golkar survived the 1998 Reformasi movement thanks to its robust party infrastructure, decisional autonomy, and strong organisational culture. These allowed Golkar to develop the thriving internal competition that was a key factor in its strong showing in the 2024 legislative election.
I consider Golkar’s competitiveness indexes to be higher than those of the other parties, as evidenced by the narrowing gap in electoral votes between Golkar and the PDI-P in the 2024 legislative elections. It is also demonstrated by the fact that it maintains a healthy party politics, with competing factions within the party fighting for the support of members to be elected to leadership positions or nominated as legislative candidates.
Having a healthy internal competition has also helped Golkar adapt to external challenges, such as electoral system changes or tougher electoral competition. Intra-oligarchic competition is another feature that characterises the party’s resilience in post-authoritarian Indonesia. In the first years of Reformasi, Akbar Tandjung defeated four-star general Edhi Sudjarat, who was supported by Indonesian Military. Akbar was then beaten by Vice President Jusuf Kalla in 2004. In 2009, coal mining oligarch Aburizal Bakrie won against media mogul Surya Paloh.
This strong internal competition sets Golkar apart from other major political parties in Indonesia such as the PDI-P, the Gerindra Party and the Democratic Party, which rely on strong figures who dominate and control them – Megawati Soekarnoputri, Prabowo Subianto and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, respectively. By contrast, in Golkar, grassroot forces have long played an important part in leadership competition. This is why it matters that the party’s internal politics remains relatively competitive.
The end of Golkar as we know it?
Prior to Airlangga’s resignation, Golkar stalwart Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan had expressed concerns about potential meddling, calling on all party members to resist any external pressure and intimidation to hold the Munaslub before December 2024. However, his pleas were not enough to stop the Munaslab being moved forward. The results of the 21 August meeting will therefore be a do-or-die moment for Golkar. It may retain its independence and keep its internal competition alive, but if it is effectively taken over by the president or those close to him, that could mean the end the party as we have known it during the Reformasi period.
The degree of competition will be measured by how many candidates contest the party’s top post and its election procedures. Will the local branches be given a say in the process? Or will there be an elite ‘consensus’ without any direct voting mechanism? Will the Munaslub revise the chair selection requirements to pave the way for a handpicked candidate to be elected?
The Munaslub will show whether or not the party is subject to external coercion. If it is, the party could lose its core identity as an internally competitive party, as it its decision making could become dictated by party oligarchs and external powers.
If the party decides to elect Bahlil as new Chair and Jokowi as Chief Patron, it could finish Golkar as a modern party with decision-making processes that could absorb, in however limited a fashion, grassroots aspirations. That means the results of the Munaslub may decide not only the fate of the party for the next few years, but also the quality of Indonesian democracy.
