Prabowo Subianto, right, and his running mate, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, celebrate with supporters on election night. Photo by Vincent Thian/AP.
A troll social media account under the name of Fufufafa in Indonesia’s oldest chat forum, Kaskus, has sparked speculation about the relationship dynamics between president-elect Prabowo Subianto and vice president-elect Gibran Rakabuming Raka, the eldest son of outgoing President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo.
The account, believed by many to have been owned by Gibran, is known to have posted insults against Prabowo before the 2019 elections. In many posts, Fufufafa described the former general, who was twice defeated by Gibran’s father, as a “sacked soldier” and a “divorcee” with a “effeminate son” and “radical supporters”.
The insults refer to the fact that Prabowo was discharged from the military after of masterminding the kidnapping of pro-democracy activists during anti-Soeharto protests in 1998. During the political crisis, Prabowo ended his marriage with Soeharto’s second daughter, Siti Hediati Hariadi, widely known as Titiek Soeharto. They have a son together, Didit Hediprasetyo, who became a fashion designer after completing his study at Parsons School of Design in New York and Paris.
Fufufafa also highlights the fact that Prabowo rallied the support of Islamist groups opposed to the Jokowi government in his first and second attempts at the presidency. The Jokowi campaign used Prabowo’s tactics — described by scholars and politicians alike as “identity politics” — against him by repeatedly associating him with radical groups.
It is not easy to verify the claims made by social media users — including political influencers linked to the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) — that Fufufafa is none other than Gibran. That said, neither Prabowo nor Gibran seems able to quash the controversy, which has only intensified as their inauguration approaches.
The main strategies they have been using are denial and evasion. When asked by the media about the allegations, Gibran said: “Go ask the account owner. Why do you ask me?” The Gerindra Party also claimed that the president-elect could not care less about “that kind of thing”, suggesting that things are fine between him and Gibran.
But regardless of whether Gibran is, in fact, Fufufafa or how Prabowo feels about it, it is naïve to suggest that the Jokowi-Prabowo alliance is built on mutual trust. The 2014 and 2019 presidential elections were not a walk in the park for the former archrivals, whose brutal battles in cyberspace reshaped Indonesia’s electoral politics.
Brutal battle in cyberspace
It is important to note that the anti-Prabowo campaigns in 2014 and 2019 were partly mobilized by progressive social media users, primarily NGO activists, who believed that the former Army Special Forces (Kopassus) commander was unfit to lead the country because of his checkered human rights records and link to the New Order. However, there is no denying that such narratives were amplified by a group of cybertroopers paid for by the Jokowi campaign, which came up with many other narratives to discredit Prabowo.
That Prabowo has never remarried after splitting from Titiek, that he has a son who is reportedly gay (still a slur in Indonesia), and that he was then close to Islamist groups were the regular tropes peddled by Jokowi’s cybertroopers. It is believed that the Jokowi campaign even came up with a hashtag “PrabowoJum’atandiMana?” (Where does Prabowo go for Friday prayer?) as a way to attack his credentials as a Muslim by implying he did not actually pray.
Prabowo was certainly not the only target of negative campaigns. His campaign was also accused of playing dirty. It allegedly created scathing narratives—some of them are based on outright misinformation—to attack Jokowi. One of them is the false allegation that he is a Christian of Chinese descent whose father was an active member the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), an outlawed political organisation.
In short, the online battle for political hegemony between 2014 and 2019 was brutal, with the elite believed to have exploited cutting-edge digital tools to tip the electoral balance. In January 2019, Prabowo publicly complained that the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) was spying on opposition figures, including him.
Prabowo reiterated this claim during a speech as president-elect at a National Mandate Party (PAN) convention in August this year, in which he responded to rumors of a falling-out between him and Jokowi by calling it a “divide and rule” tactic. He said: “Don’t use old tactics. Divide and rule. Spying on people. Intelligence operations should be for the people, the nation. Don’t spy on political rivals. That’s not good.”
All this means that if solid proof ever emerges that Gibran was one of the online warriors deployed by the Jokowi campaign to attack Prabowo, that would certainly further complicate the dynamics of their seemingly fragile and awkward partnership.
But what really concerns Prabowo is probably not what Gibran did. It’s what he plans to do in the next few years.
Gibran has his eyes on the presidency
There can be little doubt that President Jokowi is attempting to build a political dynasty to secure his legacy and retain his access to state power once his term ends in a few weeks.
It is safe to assume that Gibran is preparing for a presidential bid either for 2029 or 2034. With Anies Baswedan failing to contest the 2024 Jakarta gubernatorial election, Gibran, now a high-ranking political figure, has huge political and material resources to expand his voter base. This will make him a formidable contender in post-Prabowo electoral contests.
It also means Prabowo will face difficult choices in the next 5 to 10 years. Will he let Gibran get the spotlight to outshine him in 2029? And if he wants to groom him for 2034, what is the guarantee that his “apprentice” will not betray him before then?
We will probably never know if Prabowo and Jokowi (and Gibran) take their past bitter enmity and political feuds personally – particularly the events of between 2014 and 2019, the most polarizing period of post-reformasi Indonesia, which led to the deaths of some Prabowo supporters. But one thing is for sure, the power struggle between Prabowo and Jokowi is far from over. In fact, it enters a new phase with the rise of Gibran as Jokowi’s most ambitious political heir.
This power struggle will define the Prabowo-Gibran relationship, and, therefore, the future of Indonesia.
