From barracks to Monas: TNI’s grandiose return to political centre stage

On 5 October 2024, the Indonesian National Military (TNI) celebrated its 79^th anniversary with great fanfare at the National Monument (Monas) complex in Central Jakarta.

Thousands of civilian onlookers flocked to see the ceremony, which received widespread media attention. Soldiers and military equipment moved down major thoroughfares towards the iconic monument during the city’s weekly car free day. Up to 100,000 military personnel took part in the event.

The grandiose ceremony was attended by President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo as well as his predecessors and successor. It was portrayed as an attempt by the elite to display a smooth transition of power from the outgoing president to president-elect Prabowo Subianto—who will take office in the next few weeks—amid rumours of fractious relationship between them.

The event, however, also sent a grim message to reformists in Indonesia: the TNI, which was told to stay in the barracks after Reformasi began, has returned to political centre stage.

This is crystal clear from the TNI’s political history.

Dwifungsi and the TNI’s creation myth

The TNI anniversary ceremony has always been a noteworthy event for observers of the institution, as it says a lot about its position within the country’s body politic.

During the Guided Democracy (1957-1966) and New Order (1966-1998) periods, the TNI’s anniversary served as an opportunity to showcase both the military might of the armed forces as well as their apparent “closeness” to the Indonesian people.

Records show that many parades were held at the large open space of Parkir Timur Senayan, not far from the Gelora Bung Karno stadium. Having it in such a public place bolstered the TNI’s claim to be one with the Indonesian people (kemanunggalan TNI-rakyat), an essential tenet of the TNI’s creation myth.

This myth is derived through the central role the TNI claims to have played in Indonesia’s struggle for independence. In this narrative, popularised by the militarised history of the New Order, the TNI, led by General Sudirman, was able to navigate the divisions and incompetence of civilian leaders during the Indonesian National Revolution (1945-1949). Through this, the official narrative says, the TNI became an effective fighting force that successfully beat back Dutch colonialism through a campaign of guerrilla warfare.

This ‘closeness’ to the people in turn gave the TNI the legitimacy to claim the mantle of dwifungsi (dual-function), which called for the military to play a role in both national defence and sociopolitical affairs. While dwifungsi had already entered military discourse towards the end of the Guided Democracy era, under the New Order it became official policy as TNI officers held both military and civilian government positions.

This, however, changed with the fall of the New Order and the beginnings of Reformasi in 1998. The financial crisis that ended the Soeharto regime, the kidnappings of political activists by members of the Kopassus Special Forces, and alleged military involvement in the 1998 riots, all contributed to the TNI’s loss of political legitimacy.

The TNI was thus forced to heed the call of the reformists to return to the barracks, with its political power curtailed by subsequent administrations. This was, in turn, reflected in the changing nature of the TNI’s anniversary celebrations. Between 1999 and 2020, commemorations of TNI Day were held on military bases, most commonly Halim Perdanakusuma Airbase in East Jakarta. While in many cases some civilians were allowed to take part in celebrations, having them on a secure military base naturally limited the degree to which the festivities could be described as a public event.

Jokowi and the TNI: The new multifungsi?

Major changes in the commemoration of TNI Day occurred under the administration of President Joko Widodo.

Initially, celebrations under his administration took a simpler tone at TNI bases including the naval base at Cilegon, Banten, and the armed forces HQ at Cilangkap, East Jakarta. An initial return to larger scale celebrations began after his re-election in 2019, although they were still held at Halim Perdanakusuma.

The major shift came with the COVID-19 pandemic. Perhaps with an eye to minimising major movements of people and maintaining social distancing, TNI Day was celebrated on a much smaller scale that year. However, the location shifted to Medan Merdeka Utara, right in front of the State Palace, with a march-past of relatively small numbers of soldiers and vehicles.

Further changes occurred after the strictest COVID-19 restrictions were lifted in 2023. The venue now moved to Monas (the National Monument), the symbolic centre of Jakarta, with larger troop and vehicle formations involved.  As mentioned, this year’s celebration, which also marks the ascent of Prabowo to presidency, was arguably the most grandiose since the downfall of Soeharto. Prabowo is, of course, a former commander of the Army Special Forces (Kopassus) and the Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad), two of the army’s most elite formations.

The symbolism of these changes is easy to see. Under Jokowi, the military has made moves to return to the centre of Indonesian politics after a relatively short stay at the margins. These changes clearly go beyond the symbolic and are reflected in changing national policy towards the military.

During his second administration, Jokowi was eager to find allies outside the political elite. In addition to being non-committal in criticising the TNI over allegations of human rights violations in West Papua, Jokowi has shown greater willingness than his predecessors to provide the TNI with increased political power.

For example, the idea of placing TNI officers within the civilian bureaucracy, a common practice during dwifungsi, has been floated by senior members of the administration since at least early 2019. This has since become formalised in in the recent Civil Servant Law (Law no. 20 of 2023), and planned revisions to the TNI Law (Law no. 34 of 2004) also aim to lift restrictions on the TNI’s business activities.

In a statement responding to allegations that the revisions to the TNI law constituted a revival of dwifungsi, the Commander of the TNI General Agus Subiyanto stated that the military was ‘no longer [doing] dwifungsi, but multifungsi‘ (multifunction).

Continuation under Prabowo

There must be doubt that the Prabowo-Gibran administration will see any reduction of the TNI’s influence.

As Minister of Defence under the Jokowi administration, Prabowo has actively sought to enhance the TNI’s political strength. For example, he threw his support behind Jokowi’s food estate programme, which ostensibly aims to improve national food sovereignty and involves the armed forces in its administration. The programme has been criticised by NGOs for being misguided and ineffective, but it has nonetheless deepened the military’s integration into networks of economic and political interests, pointing towards the TNI’s political ambitions.

On Prabowo’s watch, the TNI has also advocated for the establishment of new military districts, which will further enhance the military’s influence in local politics.

Prabowo’s appointment by Jokowi to the position of full honorary general in February 2024 both ended the unfinished business of his army career and emphasised the influence of his military background on his political career. For the first time since President Yudhoyono, the armed forces have one of their own as Head of Government.

Prabowo emerged from New Order military as a product of dwifungsi, and now everything points to a more complete return to the dwifungsi under his new administration.JOnt