Presidential candidate Megawati Soekarnoputri (right) and her running mate, Prabowo Subianto, wave to supporters during a campaign rally in Jakarta in 2009. Photo by Mast Irham/EPA

Earlier this month, senior officials of the Gerindra party, Sufmi Dasco Ahmad and Habiburokhman, met with several pro-democracy activists from the 1997/1998 period and their family members.

The former activists and family members who attended the meeting are connected to what is known as kasus orang hilang, the case of the disappeared. This refers to the security forces kidnapping at least twenty-three activists in 1997/1998. Of those taken, nine returned and another was found killed, while the fate of thirteen others is still officially unknown. A 2005 investigation by Komnas HAM, Indonesia’s National Human Rights Commission, concluded that a team from the Army’s Special Forces (Kopassus) was responsible for the disappearances. This team acted on the direct orders of the then commander of Kopassus: Prabowo Subianto, head of the Gerindra party and now Indonesia’s president-elect.

Prabowo’s involvement in the case is no secret. In August 1998, just months after the fall of the New Order regime, Prabowo was discharged from the military for his role in the abduction of the activists, among other things. For many years, he was banned from entering the United States because of his involvement in other human rights violations, including in Indonesian-occupied East Timor, although this ban was cancelled after Prabowo became Defence Minister in 2019.

Prabowo has never been formally charged for these crimes. This is reflective of entrenched impunity for human rights violations in Indonesia, which is perhaps best illustrated by Prabowo’s ability to run for the presidency three times, culminating in a landslide victory earlier this year. Indeed, for years many efforts to hold perpetrators of human rights violations to account have failed. This can be attributed to weaknesses in the judicial system, active opposition from the military and political elites (including direct interference in the legal process), and limited societal support for justice for past human rights crimes.

During the presidency of Joko Widodo (‘Jokowi’) several attempts were made to address past human rights violations. However, they largely moved away from human rights standards. Invoking culturalist arguments (that is, arguing for more “culturally appropriate” mechanisms), these initiatives have focused on keeping cases of human rights violations away from the courts. As such, they have done little to deliver justice to those victimised, instead shielding the military and other elites from accountability.

The last such effort was Jokowi’s 2023 acknowledgment of several cases of gross human rights violations in Indonesia – including the disappearances of the pro-democracy activists. As part of this acknowledgment, Jokowi expressed regret that the violations had occurred and promised that compensation would be awarded to victims. Jokowi’s statement followed from recommendations made by the so-called Team for the Non-Judicial Resolution of Gross Human Rights Violations of the Past (PPHAM). The name of this body clearly indicated that the acknowledgment was not aimed at bringing perpetrators to justice in a court of law.

The Prabowo camp has used the 2023 acknowledgment to deflect criticism of Prabowo’s human rights record. During first debate of presidential candidates on 12 December 2023, Ganjar Pranowo challenged Prabowo on his human rights record. Prabowo expressed exhaustion with the matter, and stated it was “being dealt with” by PPHAM chair and Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Mahfud MD – who just happened to be Ganjar’s running mate. Prabowo also stated that former foes were now supporting him – most likely a reference to Budiman Soedjatmiko, a former activist detained during the New Order who joined Prabowo’s campaign and to whom Prabowo casually said “sorry man, I used to chase you. But I’ve already apologised, right?”.

Fast forward to the recent meeting, Dasco – who is widely regarded as one of Prabowo’s closest advisors – similarly stated that violations of the past have been resolved (diselesaikan) by the government. He added that the families of the missing persons and the activists in attendance agreed with this, and that the meeting was aimed at strengthening good relationships (silaturahmi).

However, there has been some debate as to whether those in attendance were aware that Gerindra officials would participate in the meeting and what would be discussed. For instance, Wahyu Susilo, human rights activist and younger brother of disappeared poet Wiji Thukul, said the meeting was a “setup”. Zaenal Muttaqin, General Secretary of the Indonesian Association of the Families of Missing Persons (IKOHI), a key NGO advocating for the rights of those victimised, stated that those who attended felt they were lied to. He said were given the impression that the meeting was initiated by IKOHI, when in fact it was organised by the Executive Office of the President (Kantor Staf Presiden, KSP). In addition, not all family members were aware of, or invited to the meeting. This suggested the meeting was deliberately selective in order to exclude those who have been consistent in claiming the rights of those victimised.

The meeting illustrates that although Prabowo has described himself “a staunch defender of human rights”, his past continues to be a concern. The participation of two of Gerindra’s most senior officials suggests that one objective of the meeting was to influence public opinion ahead of Prabowo’s inauguration in October. In addition, the meeting has done little to unite human rights advocates in Indonesia.

In the years ahead, this lack of cohesion may create problems for Indonesia’s human rights movement, which has been characterised by institutional weakness and internal division. Further fragmentation and weakening of the movement are perhaps exactly what Prabowo and his team are aiming for.

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